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Summary 
The integration of refugees and migrants in general into the labour market – and into society at large –stands 
at the forefront of current policy debate. And rightly so: better integration enriches not only the migrant, but 
also the host country’s population and its public finances. 
A number of recent noteworthy publications have therefore studied the labour market integration process 
and how to improve it. While the diverse background of new arrivals is often acknowledged in these studies, 
on-the-ground labour market integration programmes too often follow a one-size-fits-all approach. In this 
Policy Insights study, we argue that there is a particularly strong case for labour market integration measures 
specifically geared towards female migrants. The primary reason is the traditionally low female labour market 
participation in the majority of source countries, which translates into a large excess gender gap in labour 
market integration among non-EU migrants in Europe. This gap is further mirrored by other important 
aspects of societal integration. We argue that this lack of labour market integration inhibits wider societal 
integration of female migrants.  
Hence, integration efforts need to more explicitly take the gender dimension into account and further 
analyse the determinants of the gender gap in integration. A mapping of successful initiatives targeting 
migrant women, as has been done in recent best-practice guidelines, is therefore essential. However, these 
studies mainly stress that the number of targeted measures is currently insufficient. 
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ith the increase in the number of refugees - and migrants more generally - arriving 
in the EU, labour market and wider societal integration has moved to the forefront 
of today’s policy debate.1 Successful integration is important from a humanitarian 
point of view, but it is also crucial for a more pragmatic economic reason: the less newcomers 
integrate into the labour market, the bigger the pressure on public budgets. 
Several noteworthy studies have recently addressed the labour market integration of 
refugees.2 While the heterogeneous socio-economic characteristics of new arrivals are often 
acknowledged in these studies, labour market integration measures are only slowly starting to 
cater to the specific needs of the diverse groups. 
Particularly striking is the gap in labour market integration – in terms of employment and labour 
market participation – between male and female migrants coming from third countries. This 
gender divide is also pronounced when one considers only individuals seeking protection in the 
EU and in countries that have recently seen a large influx of refugees, and persists in labour 
markets over time. The available evidence points to low-skilled individuals as the main driver 
of the gender divide among migrants, but the gap is visible across all skill groups and differs 
between host countries.   
These relatively low labour force participation rates of third-country female migrants deserve 
particular attention for two main reasons. First and most importantly, labour market 
integration and wider societal integration seem to move in line with each other (Barslund et 
al., 2017). Excluding non-EU female migrants from the labour market may marginalise them in 
their host country’s society (Riller, 2009). Second, participation rates of women entering the 
EU from third countries are often low in their country of origin. For example, the economic 
activity rate of females stood at less than 15% in Syria in 2011.3 In addition, there may be 
cultural factors playing a more salient role for female than male migrants. Encouraging and 
                                                     
1 We use the terms “migrants” and “third-country nationals” interchangeably throughout the text to refer to 
individuals born outside the EU28. The term refugee refers to a third-country national who is a resident of an EU28 
country in order to seek international protection. Third-country national status is granted on the basis of country 
of birth when known; otherwise, on citizenship. For measures of labour market integration we use the prime-age 
labour force, i.e. individuals aged 25 to 54 years old.    
2 See e.g. European Commission (2016a, b), Eurofound (2016), EMN (2016), Bertelsmann (2016a, b), OECD/EU 
(2015), Konle-Seidl and Bolits (2016), Benton et al. (2016). 
3 Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics. The World Development Indicator (WDI) database indicates similar numbers 
for Iraq and Afghanistan.  
W 
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supporting Syrian women to join the labour force thus poses a challenge to EU national and 
regional policymakers that requires tools beyond standard active labour market policies. 
We therefore argue that efforts at integration need to more explicitly take the gender 
dimension into account and further analyse the determinants of the gender gap in integration. 
A mapping of successful initiatives targeting migrant women, as has been done in recent best-
practice guidelines, is essential, but these studies mainly stress that the number of targeted 
measures is currently insufficient. 
1. Large gender gaps in participation and employment rates among third-country 
nationals  
The low female labour force participation and employment rates among third-country 
nationals in the EU are the sum of two effects. First, labour force participation and employment 
rates are generally lower for third-country nationals in the EU than for the native-born 
population. This is particularly the case for member states that have recently been major 
destination countries for refugees. Second, while a gender gap exists for both native-born and 
migrants regarding labour market participation and employment rates, it is much larger for 
migrants in some countries. This can be illustrated by plotting the difference between 
employment and participation rates in 2015 for native-born and third-country nationals for 
men and women separately (Figure 1, top panel). The excess gender gap is the difference 
between the two bars.  
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Figure 1. Differences in activity and employment rates between native-born and third-country 
nationals, 25-54 year olds, percentage points (p.p.) 
 
 
Notes: Countries with the largest number of asylum seekers in 2015. Third-country nationals defined by country of birth; except 
for Germany (country of citizenship, Eurostat tables lfsa_ergan and lfsa_argan).  
Source: Eurostat (Employment: table lfsa_ergacob. Activity: table lfsa_argacob). 
It is important to keep in mind that the revealed differences come on top of the existing gender 
gap (among the native-born population) in employment and activity rates. This difference stood 
at around 10 p.p. in 2015 in EU28 for 25-54 year olds. Thus, for example, in Austria the 
employment rate gender difference for third-country nationals is an additional 10 p.p. (Figure 
1, top panel, right).  
Differences among countries may be due to a number of factors, e.g. heterogeneity in terms 
of migrants’ origins, their educational level, as well as the number and age of children. We 
therefore stress the EU-wide nature of the gender gap rather than focusing on country 
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comparisons, and note that in most countries, parts of the excess gender gap between non-EU 
female migrants and their native-born counterparts still persist after controlling for important 
socio-economic differences (Rubin et al., 2008).  
The significant differences found in migrants’ educational attainment between genders do 
explain some part of the excess gap in individual countries, but at the EU28 level the available 
evidence points to an equal level of education for men and women for third-country migrants.4 
Moreover, the gender gap is a persistent feature of third-country nationals’ labour market 
integration (Figure 1, bottom panels). Despite the different economic conditions over time in 
some of the reported countries, gender gaps changed very little. There is evidence from some 
countries that the excess gender gap is closing in line with the duration of stay in the host 
country. However, the pace is slow.  
While the available statistics on employment rates of migrants by educational attainment are 
incomplete, there is some evidence that the differences in labour market integration among 
low-skilled migrants are main driver of the gender gap (European Commission, 2016a). There 
are substantial differences among countries, however. For example, in Germany and France, 
the excess gender gap among non-EU migrants is as large for high skilled as for low skilled 
(Figure 2). In Sweden, the gender gap increases with education, whereas in Italy the gender gap 
among the low-skilled is actually smaller for third-country nationals than for the native-born 
population.  
Figure 2. Excess gender gap in employment rates by educational attainment, 25-54 year olds (2014) 
 
Note: Excess gender gap defined as the gender gap among third-country nationals minus the gender gap among native-born. 
Numbers not fully compatible with Figure 1 because of differences in the definition of third-country national and reference 
year (2014 versus 2015 in Figure 1). This figure is based on citizenship (country of birth not available), whereas Figure 1 uses 
country of birth. Fully comparable numbers are also not reported by Eurostat. Data for EU28 are not available. Low skilled 
corresponds to ISCED 0-2, medium to 3-4 and high to 5+. 
Source: EU-LFS special 2014 module (table lfso_14lempr). 
                                                     
4 See European Commission (2016a), and Eurostat (table edat_lfs_9912) and EC-OECD (2016). 
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The share of third-country nationals with low educational attainment ranges between 30% and 
50% among the countries displayed (35% for the EU28 as a whole). Hence reducing the excess 
gender gap among low-skilled will make a difference in some countries, but the problem is not 
limited to this particular group. Numbers from the European Commission (2016a) indicate that 
low-skilled individuals are the primary driver of the gender gap among refugees; however, the 
Commission’s data consider the population of 15-64 year olds, where age differences among 
educational groups are likely to be a confounding factor. 
1.1 Lack of labour market integration of migrant women has macroeconomic 
implications 
The integration of migrant women into the labour market may foremost be a social issue. In 
many countries, however, the gender differences are large enough to be of macroeconomic 
importance. To illustrate this observation, consider the following thought experiment for 
Austria: Assume that the excess gender gap in labour market participation rates among third-
country nationals is closed, such that labour force participation rates mimic that of the native-
born population. This is less ambitious than may appear at first sight; we only assume that 
migrant women become as integrated into the labour market – measured by participation – as 
migrant men. Migrants, men and women, in this exercise still have lower participation rates 
than the native-born population. In the case of Austria, the rate is 7 p.p. lower (Figure 1, top 
panel, left), which would imply a reduction of the gender gap from around 22 pp. to 7 pp. With 
almost 250,000 non-EU women aged 25 to 54 residing in Austria, this would increase the prime 
labour force (25-54 year olds) by more than 1%.  
2. Gender differences in societal integration: The role of participatory citizenship 
Recent studies on labour market integration of refugees justify their focus on economic 
integration by arguing that a broader societal integration follows automatically when migrants 
obtain employment. While this link seems intuitive, the evidence in the literature is relatively 
scarce. Arguably, “social integration” as a notion is hard to define, and reverse causality 
between the two types of integration cannot be ruled out.  For example, a strong social network 
could help with the job search as much as a new job could help social inclusion. 
However, sociological research supports the idea of labour market integration as a stepping 
stone to social inclusion. Working is more than a means of economic support and the non-
monetary value of work manifests itself in a feeling of being part of the society and imparts a 
sense of purpose (Morse and Weiss, 1955). On the other hand, losing one’s job may result in 
social isolation, among other negative psychological effects (Jones, 1988). It should be noted 
that whether employment has the effect of promoting social inclusion also depends on the 
quality of the new job (Atkinson, 1998).   
It still remains an important question to what extent gender gaps in labour market integration 
reflect gender gaps in social integration. Theoretically, the importance of employment for 
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integration into a society could differ between males and females. We argue below, however, 
that this is not the case.  
As noted above, measuring the extent of integration into society is clearly not a straightforward 
exercise, and no single measure would be able to cover all dimensions of integration. The 
European Commission has proposed a useful set of indicators to measure social integration, 
the so-called Zaragoza indicators. In addition to various measures of labour market integration, 
these indicators cover health status, educational attainment, social inclusion, the rate of 
naturalisation and the share of migrants with long-term residence status (OECD/EU, 2015). 
While these are important indicators for the well-being of the migrant population, they have 
limited participatory content in the sense of measuring active participation in the host country’s 
societies.5 
In order to capture migrants’ active participation in the host country’s society, Barslund et al. 
(2017) measure wider social integration by building on the active citizenship index proposed by 
Hoskins and Mascherini (2008). Specifically, they measure the proportion of the population 
that has participated in at least one of the following seven indicators:6 
o “worked (as a volunteer) in an organization or association” 
o “signed a petition”  
o “taken part in lawful public demonstration”  
o “boycotted certain products”  
o “worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker”  
o “contacted politician or government official”  
o “member of political party”. 
These seven indicators are available in the European Social Survey (ESS) in all waves from 2002 
to 2014 (latest available wave). Furthermore, the ESS contains country of birth at the individual 
level as well as other characteristics. By pooling all seven rounds of the ESS, the authors obtain 
a large sample of both native-born and third-country nationals and calculate the gender gaps 
in active citizenship by level of education (Table 1). 
 
 
                                                     
5 Alternatively, the prevalence of intermarriage has been used as an indicator for (long-term) social integration 
(Dribe and Lundh, 2008; Meng and Meurs, 2009; Meng and Gregory, 2005). Gender effects are present in these 
studies as well. 
6 Hoskins & Mascherini (2008) used 61 indicators in their composite indicator based on a special module of the 
European Social Survey (ESS) in 2002. The majority of these indicators are unavailable in later surveys. Seven of 
the indicators, the ones used here, are repeated in every round of the ESS. The same seven indicators were used 
in Hoskins et al. (2008). 
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Table 1. Proportion involved in active citizenship by country of birth, gender and education, EU28, 
25-54 year olds (2002-2014) 
 Total Low Medium High 
  
Native 
born 
Third-
country 
national 
Native 
born 
Third-
country 
national 
Native 
born 
Third-
country 
national 
Native 
born 
Third-
country 
national 
Men 51.0 43.4 36.7 34.2 47.6 42.0 67.4 56.6 
Women 49.4 36.3 35.4 24.2 45.8 34.6 65.2 51.2 
Difference 1.6 7.1 1.3 10 1.8 7.4 2.2 5.4 
N 118,561 6,989 23,906 1,979 53,312 2,417 40,875 2,520 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the European Social Survey (round 1-7). Means are weighted. 
The picture is very similar to that for labour market participation and employment rates. Third-
country nationals are in general less likely to have participated in one of the active citizenship 
activities, but in addition, the gender gap is much larger, particularly for the low skilled. 
Barslund et al. (2017) also look at the association between employment and social integration 
using the indicator approach described above. They show that the initial unemployment rate 
in the host country is negatively correlated with current employment and active citizenship. In 
addition, as one would expect, they find that the impact of initial unemployment rate fades 
with the passage of time lived in the host country. They argue that the mechanism runs from 
poor initial labour market conditions towards lower employment prospects in the years 
following arrival, which again negatively affect social integration outcomes. That 
unemployment has longer-term negative effects on employment prospects is a well-known 
finding from the literature on the impact of recessions on unemployment spells (Barslund and 
Gros, 2013). 
If a causal mechanism leading from labour market integration to better social integration does 
indeed exist, the rationale to improve migrant women’s labour market outcomes is much 
reinforced.  
3. On the ground: What is done to integrate migrant women? 
The question arises whether integration measures can be designed to cater specifically to the 
needs of women. Evidence from Australia suggests that, if cultural aspects are considered, 
labour market integration of refugee women can be achieved (Bertelsmann, 2016a). For 
example, a programme to support micro-entrepreneurship of refugee and migrant women led 
more than 40% of the participants to start their own business (Bodsworth, 2013).7 
Tailored initiatives are still scarce in the EU. A few exceptions exist. For example, the Austrian 
programme ‘Mama lernt Deutsch!’ by the municipal authority of Vienna targets refugee 
women by teaching skills relevant to the group and offering child care (EMN, 2016). Further, 
                                                     
7 The culturally sensitive design in this programme included exclusively female mentoring and childcare assistance.  
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recently-introduced programmes in Austria conduct competence checks with a focus on female 
refugees. Other countries such as Denmark are extending their labour market integration 
programmes to broaden the integration support offered to women (Bertelsmann, 2016b). In 
Germany, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) offers language classes to 
migrant women, which also include practical help with childcare and education as well as 
discussions of cultural differences.8  
We draw two conclusions from the recent evidence we have reviewed here. First, while the 
above list is not exhaustive and local initiatives exist in many EU countries, labour market 
integration programmes tailored to women’s needs are generally insufficient. Second, the little 
evidence we find suggests that tailored measures can be successful. However, too few 
initiatives exist to evaluate their success in a meaningful way.   
The European Commission’s “Repository of promising practices” is an excellent example of a 
platform that could be extended to categorise best practices by their specific target groups.9 
While we applaud the Commission’s prompt reaction to the need for such a platform, we note 
that the database is currently a rather limited and loose collection of successful initiatives. We 
highly encourage European authorities to build on the Commission’s recent efforts and provide 
national, regional, and local policymakers with the tools that are necessary to support the most 
vulnerable groups of (forced) migrants. Among these groups, female refugees appear to 
receive particularly little support at this time. 
  
                                                     
8 http://www.bamf.de/DE/Willkommen/DeutschLernen/Integrationskurse/SpezielleKursarten/Frauenkurse/fraue
nkurse-node.html 
9 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1208&langId=en 
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